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Human Rights, Counter-terrorism and Criminology: 
The Siren Call of Security
Claire Hamilton
Professor of Criminology, Maynooth University
ABSTRACT
In light of recent departures from human rights standards in the name of ‘secu-
rity’, this paper argues that the application of governmentality-informed crimi-
nological concepts may help to illuminate the process and context in which such 
departures are made and the ‘rationalities’ and ‘knowledges’ that facilitate them. 
By forcing us to pay attention to the power-knowledge networks inherent in the 
bureaucratic, political and juridical apparatus through which rights are negoti-
ated, the governmentality analytic opens up important possibilities for a politi-
cally richer, more self-reflexive and ultimately less disingenuous rights discourse.
INTRODUCTION
If the human rights era is currently in its twilight, as some commentators con-
tend, then the Al-Qaeda attacks of 11 September 2001 mark an important stag-
ing post in its demise. As Conor Gearty remarks in his insightful aetiology of the 
current crisis, the response to the events of 11 September dealt a ‘hammer blow’ 
to human rights globally, providing a new and convenient ‘means for the asser-
tion by states all around the world of their national power over international 
scrutiny, especially in the field of human rights’.1 While the range of illegal con-
duct engaged in by the American executive in the period post-11 September ele-
vated the United States to international notoriety, less appreciated perhaps is the 
impact of counter-terrorism law and policy on the penal trajectory of the 
European Union. Despite a stronger, more embedded commitment to human 
rights,2 counter-terrorism measures imposed on EU member states have been 
described as a ‘turbo’ to the penalisation engine, resulting in a significant  escalation 
1Conor Gearty, ‘Is the human rights era drawing to a close?’, European Human Rights Law 
Review 5 (2017), 425–31: 428.
2See, for example, Sonja Snacken and Els Dumortier, Resisting punitiveness in Europe? 
(Abingdon, Oxon; New York, 2012); Tom Daems, Dirk van Zyl Smit and Sonja Snacken (eds), 
European penology? (Oxford, 2013); Barry Vaughan and Shane Kilcommins, ‘The Europeanisation 
of human rights and the limits of authoritarian policing in Ireland’, European Journal of 
Criminology 4 (4) (2007), 437–59.
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in penal measures and a punitive climate in Europe.3 State- and EU-level responses 
that have followed the recent spate of terror attacks have only served to com-
pound fears. Surveying the national security landscape in European countries 
since 2014, Amnesty International stated the problem bluntly: ‘Brick by brick, 
the edifice of rights protection that was so carefully constructed after the Second 
World War, is being dismantled.’4
Taking this literature as its point of departure, this paper seeks, first of all, to 
map the human rights impacts of some of the flagship counter-terrorism measures 
adopted by the European Union since 2001. What may be termed the ‘siren call of 
security’ in Europe remains a pressing issue given the ‘increasing dosages’5 of secu-
rity measures that meet each new attack. In an effort to counteract this, the paper 
argues that the application of governmentality-informed criminological concepts 
may help to illuminate the process and context in which such departures from 
human rights standards are made and the ‘rationalities’ and ‘knowledges’ which 
facilitate them. By forcing us to pay attention to the power-knowledge networks 
inherent in the bureaucratic, political and juridical apparatus through which rights 
are negotiated, the governmentality analytic6 opens up important possibilities for 
a politically richer, more self-reflexive and ultimately less disingenuous rights dis-
course. The paper proceeds as follows. Part 1 examines the recent history of 
counter-terrorism law and policy in the European Union, where the enactment of 
a significant body of counter-terrorism legislation since 11 September has driven 
radical and permanent change in at least some areas of mainstream criminal law 
and procedure, with significant implications for human rights. Following on from 
this, Part 2 discusses some of the limitations of human rights as identified in the 
criminological literature and contemplates the role of governmental criminology, 
as inspired by the work of French philosopher and historian, Michel Foucault, in 
identifying potential sites for progressive intervention.
PART 1: EUROPE AND THE SIREN CALL OF SECURITY
It is axiomatic that the events of 11 September threw up new and unprecedented 
challenges for defenders of human rights. In the wake of this apparently new 
brand of terrorism, a new brand of counter-terrorism measures emerged, incor-
porating, as is now well known, various illegalities in the form of Guantanamo, 
Abu Ghraib, torture black sites, wholesale executive surveillance and much else. 
While European leaders showed more restraint in terms of their commitment 
to the rule of law, in Europe various examples of ‘counter law’ or ‘law against 
law’7, precautionary logic8 and securitising measures abound.9 Perhaps of most 
3Els Dumortier et al., ‘The rise of the penal state: what can human rights do about it?’ in 
Snacken and Dumortier, Resisting punitiveness in Europe? 107–32.
4Amnesty International, Dangerously disproportionate: the ever-expanding national security 
state in Europe (London, 2017).
5Oren Gross, ‘Chaos and rules: should responses to violent crises always be constitutional?’ The 
Yale Law Journal 112 (5) (2003), 1011–34.
6Studying social relations from the point of view of governmentality means focussing on gover-
nance as a mentality or rationality of rule. Governmentality is an influential, but somewhat varied 
approach. Governmental criminology has been described as a ‘variable approach to criminology 
influenced by Foucault’ (Pat O’Malley, ‘Governmental criminology’, in Eugene McLaughlin and 
Tim Newburn (eds), The SAGE handbook of criminological theory (London, 2009), 319–36: 319). 
7Richard V. Ericson, Crime in an insecure world (London, 2007).
8Liora Lazarus, Benjamin Goold and Caitlin Goss, ‘Control without punishment: understand-
ing coercion’, in Jonathon Simon and Richard Sparks (eds), The SAGE handbook of punishment 
and society (London, 2013), 463–92.
9Estella Baker, ‘Governing through crime? The case of the European Union’, European Journal 
of Criminology 7 (3) (2010), 187–213. 
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concern is the fact that in Europe the post-11 September drive towards securiti-
sation effected radical and permanent change in some critical areas of main-
stream criminal law and procedure, in contradistinction to the more conservative 
approach to domestic law reform adopted by the US state in the post-11 
September period.10 While not gainsaying in any way the highly punitive execu-
tive measures taken by the US in the period immediately following the Twin 
Tower attacks, such measures have at least permitted a certain retrenchment in 
the face of political and legal opposition.11 In Europe, on the other hand, while 
procedural protections may ‘balance out’ some of the existing counter-terrorism 
measures, it is highly unlikely that we will see any such measures reversed.12
Much of the explanation for this process of securitisation relates to timing. 
The 11 September terrorism emergency occurred precisely at the moment when 
the EU was beginning to assert itself  in the criminal justice field (the EU had 
created an ‘area of security, justice and freedom’ in 1999), resulting in counter-
terrorism becoming the focal point for the development of the EU’s role in this 
area.13 The sheer volume of counter-terrorism measures adopted by the EU 
bears testament to this with a recent report by SECILE identifying 239 such 
measures for the period 2001–13.14 While implementation of some of these mea-
sures has been patchy,15 many of the most significant (and controversial) instru-
ments in terms of their impact on domestic criminal justice have now been 
successfully transposed and implemented by member states.16
Following the attacks, the European Council hastily arranged an extraordi-
nary (emergency) meeting of the chefs de cabinet in Brussels on 21 September. 
The meeting sought to address perceived deficiencies in EU action in this area, 
namely, the lack of a common legal definition of terrorism, the absence of a 
harmonised system of penalties and a basis for accelerated extradition, and set 
itself  the deadline of December 2001 to reach agreement on several legal acts.17 
10Kent Roach, The 9/11 effect: comparative counter-terrorism (Cambridge, 2011); Claire 
Hamilton, ‘The European Union: sword or shield? Comparing counter-terrorism law in the EU 
and USA after 9/11’, Theoretical Criminology 22 (2) (2018), 206–25.
11David Cole, ‘Military commissions and the paradigm of prevention’, in Fionnuala Ní Aoláin 
and  Oren Goss (eds), Guantanamo and beyond: exceptional courts and military commissions in 
comparative perspective (Cambridge, 2013), 95–116; Hamilton, ‘The European Union: sword or 
shield?’ 
12Mariana Chaves, ‘EU’s harmonization of national criminal law: between punitiveness and 
moderation’, European Public Law 21 (3) (2015), 527–53; Cian Murphy, ‘Counter-terrorism law 
and policy: operationalisation and normalisation of exceptional law after the “War on Terror”’, in 
Diego Acosta Arcarazo and Cian Murphy (eds), EU security and justice law: after Lisbon and 
Stockholm (Oxford, 2013).
13Cian Murphy, ‘EU Counter-terrorism and the rule of law in a post-“War on Terror” world’, 
in Martin Scheinin (ed), European and United States counter-terrorism policies, the rule of law and 
human rights, RSCAS Policy Paper 2011/03, available at: http://www.cesruc.org/uploads/
soft/130221/1-130221192106.pdf (8 August 2018).
14SECILE, Catalogue of EU Counter-Terrorism Measures Adopted since 11 September 2011. 
Available at: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/dec/secile-catalogue-of-EU-counter-terror-
ism-measures.pdf (8 August 2018).
15Monica Den Boer, ‘Fusing the fragments: challenges for the EU International security gover-
nance on terrorism’ in Dieter Mahncke and Joerg Monar (eds), International terrorism: a 
European response to a global threat? (Brussels, 2006). European Commission, Report from the 
Commission based on Article 11 of the Council Framework Decision on combatting terrorism of 13 
June 2002. COM/2007/681.
16European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the implementation of Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008 
amending Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism. COM/2014/0554.
17Jorg Monar, ‘Anti-terrorism law and policy: the case of the European Union’, in Victor 
V. Ramraj, Michael Hor and Kent Roach (eds), Global anti-terrorism law and policy (Cambridge, 2005), 
425–52.
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While the European Commission had been working on proposals in these areas 
for many months it is difficult to overstate the transformative effect of the 11 
September attacks in this area: as Monica den Boer has written, ‘All of a sudden 
decisions were possible on dormant dossiers’.18 By 27 December 2001, the EU 
had constructed the two main pillars of its counter-terrorism strategy: a com-
mon definition of terrorism (the first such definition by an international body) 
and a Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (FDCT), overhauling the 
law on extradition between member states.19
As the trigger for a wide range of coercive powers the definition of terrorism 
is obviously critical,20 however, in an EU context this issue assumed particular 
importance as so few member states had any specific legislation criminalising 
terrorism prior to the adoption of the Framework Decision in 2002.21 Indeed, 
the number of member states with legislation that criminalised terrorist acts 
autonomously went from 6 prior to 11 September to 22 by 2007.22 Roach 
describes this as ‘an explosive growth’ or ‘viral propagation of anti-terrorism 
laws in Europe’ whose impact should not be underestimated.23 In terms of 
reforms at member state level, the definition of terrorist offences inevitably led 
to the adoption of new criminal offences in those states without anti-terrorism 
legislation. Moreover, legislation was also required in those states that already 
had counter-terrorism legislation in place given that they all had definitions of 
terrorism that were narrower than the EU’s. In the 2002 Framework Decision on 
Combating Terrorism these new offences took the form of directing, creating, 
supporting or participating in a terrorist group and this was extended in 2008 to 
include offences of public provocation to commit a terrorist offence, recruit-
ment, and training for terrorism (including via the Internet). These offences have 
been criticised for the threat they pose to fundamental legal principles as well as 
the preventative or pre-emptive direction in which they take the criminal law.24 
Indeed, such was the concern of the European Parliament about the 2008 
amendments that it sought to introduce human rights safeguards into the legis-
lation, amendments which were rejected by the Council, save for a declaratory 
(and arguably superfluous) statement regarding the general requirement to 
respect fundamental rights.25 It is worth noting that all of these offences are sub-
ject to enhanced sentencing as the Decision also provided for minimum maxi-
mum sentences (15 years for directing and eight for participatory or preparatory 
acts). This is the case even if  group offences are not applicable to an individual, 
18Monica den Boer, ‘Fusing the fragments: challenges for EU internal security governance on 
terrorism’, in Dieter Mahncke and Jorg Monar (eds), International terrorism: a European response 
to a global threat? (Brussels, 2006), 83–111: 90.
19Council of the European Union, Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European 
Arrest Warrant and the Surrender Procedures between Member States. 2002/584/JHA; Council of 
the European Union, Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism. 
2002/475/JHA.
20Amnesty International, Human rights dissolving at the borders? Counter-terrorism and EU 
criminal law (Brussels, 2005); Cian Murphy, EU Counter-terrorism law: pre-emption and the rule of 
law (Oxford, 2012).
21Javier Argomaniz, ‘Post-9/11 institutionalisation of European counter-terrorism: emergence, 
acceleration and inertia’, European Security 18 (2) (2009), 151–72; Amnesty International, Human 
rights dissolving at the borders?
22Chaves, ‘EU’s harmonization of national criminal law: between punitiveness and moderation’.
23Kent Roach, ‘Introduction: comparative counter-terrorism law comes of age’, in Kent Roach 
(ed.), Comparative counter-terrorism law (Cambridge, 2015), 1–48: 29.
24Murphy, EU counter-terrorism law; Francesca Galli, The law on terrorism: the UK, France and 
Italy compared (Brussels, 2015).
25European Parliament, Report on the proposal for a Council Framework Decision amending 
Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism. COM/2007/0650.
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given the requirement for member states to enact ‘effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive’26 criminal penalties for all offences linked to terrorism.27
In Europe, moreover, the problems associated with these associative and pre-
paratory offences are compounded by the EU definition of terrorism itself. This 
definition is also expansive, defining terrorist acts as those committed with the 
aim of: 
seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a Government or 
international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any 
act, or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, con-
stitutional, economic or social structures of  a country or an international 
organisation.28 
The list of offences goes beyond violence to include serious property damage 
‘likely to result in major economic loss’,29 a move that has been criticised, partic-
ularly when interpreted in the context of the broadly drafted ‘unduly compel-
ling’ a government.30 While drafted more tightly than the UK provisions, it does 
appear broader than the definitions adopted by most of the UN conventions on 
terrorism and indeed the US Patriot Act.31
The European Arrest Warrant (EAW)—‘the jewel in the crown of the EU’s 
response to the terrorist attacks’32—probably represents one of  the most prom-
inent yet possibly also the most controversial of  the EU counter-terrorism mea-
sures.33 While proposals for the EAW predated the events of  11 September, 
negotiations between member states on this sensitive area were so protracted 
that it really only became ‘politically palatable’34 in the period after the attacks. 
Indeed, while the proposal had already been under preparation by officials for 
a period of  two years, national views on the most basic features of  the instru-
ment were ‘very, very far apart’35 until the events of  11 September. The measure, 
adopted in a Framework Decision of  13 June 2002, revolutionised laws relating 
to extradition in the EU, effectively transforming what was once a detailed judi-
cial procedure with strict legal requirements, such as the dual criminality rule, 
into an administrative ‘box-ticking exercise’.36 The procedure is now a summary 
one whereby the merits of  the request are taken on trust and the receiving mem-
ber state is obliged to execute an EAW unless one of  the very limited grounds 
of  objection is applicable. The considerable efficiencies gained by the mea-
sure  (particularly the reduction in delays) have been noted by the European 
26Article 5, FDCT.
27Murphy, EU counterterrorism law. 
28Article 1(1), Council of the European Union, Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on 
Combating Terrorism. 2002/475/JHA.
29Article 1(1)(d), Council of the European Union, Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 
on Combating Terrorism. 2002/475/JHA.
30Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, ‘The rule of law in the European Union: putting the security into the 
area of freedom, security and justice’, European Law Review 29 (2) (2004), 219–42.
31Lucia Zedner, ‘Review of 9/11 effect’, University of Toronto Law Journal 63 (4) (2013), 161–65; 
Roach, Comparative counter-terrorism law. 
32Douglas Scott, ‘The rule of law in the European Union’, 223.
33Elias Van Sliedregt, ‘European approaches to fighting terrorism’. Duke Journal of Comparative 
and International Law 20 (2010), 222–35.
34Cian Murphy ‘The Constitution of EU Counterterrorism Law’, 16 July 2012, available at: 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-constitution-of-eu-counter-terrorism-law/ (8 August 2018).
35Christian Kaunert, ‘Without the power of purse or sword: the European arrest warrant and 
the role of the commission’, Journal of European Integration 29 (4) (2007), 387–404: 396.
36James MacGuill, ‘European arrest warrant in Ireland: an uneven playing field’, Paper pre-
sented at European Arrest Warrant and EU-US Extradition Conference, Irish Centre for European 
Law, Trinity College Dublin, 19 June 2004.
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Commission,37 something which, given that justice delayed is often justice 
denied, may well work in ease of  requested persons. Yet the benefits in terms of 
expeditious hearings must also be considered against strong concerns voiced 
about disproportionality, violations of  procedural rights, poor detention condi-
tions and the imprisonment of  innocent persons.38 While space constraints do 
not permit a full examination of  the concerns voiced, two observations relevant 
to the current argument can be made. First, as with the FDCT discussed above, 
it is surprising given the ostensible respect for human rights principles pro-
claimed in various EU legal instruments that the prospect of  serious breaches 
of  human rights was not expressly stated as a ground on which extradition 
could be refused, an omission that has led to highly variable protection of  rights 
across member states.39 Another significant concern is with net-widening or 
‘function creep’40 which was evident from the legislation’s inception: while it 
was presented to member states and to the public as a key counter-terrorist 
measure it included within its scope a long list of  32 offences, many of  which, 
such as road traffic offences, are not even offences of  specific intent. 
Unsurprisingly, this has resulted in the majority of  requests being issued for 
ordinary rather than terrorist offences as well as the systematic use of  the EAW 
procedure for minor offences.41 This is unfortunate given the severely damaging 
effect which the disproportionate use of  the EAW can have on individuals 
sought by requesting states; not only can they be taken away from their homes, 
families and employment for a lengthy period, perhaps for years, but they will 
in all likelihood be denied bail by virtue of  the very fact of  being a resident of 
another country.42
While the EU has been active in the counter-terrorism area in its own right, 
as a supranational legal framework, it has also played an important role in the 
implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions. EC Regulation 2580/2001 
implemented UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001) and also instituted the EU’s own 
autonomous counter-terrorist restrictive measures regime.43 Initially, the EU 
adopted a highly secretive and legally complex approach to the blacklisting pro-
cess which, alarmingly, appeared to preclude judicial review.44 This approach, 
37European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the implementation since 2007 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the 
European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States. COM/2011/0175. 
38Thomas Hammarberg, ‘Overuse of the European arrest warrant—a threat to human rights’. 
The Council of Europe Commissioner’s Human Rights Comment. Available at: https://www.coe.int/
en/web/commissioner/-/overuse-of-the-european-arrest-warrant-a-threat-to-human-rights?inheri-
tRedirect=true (8 August); European Parliament, Resolution of 27 February 2014 with recommen-
dations to the Commission on the review of the European Arrest Warrant. A7–0039/2014.
39Gabor Magyar, ‘The European arrest warrant: a current evaluation’. Paper presented at semi-
nar on the pre-Lisbon instruments: Special Focus on the European Arrest Warrant, European 
Centre for Judges and Lawyers (European Institute of Public Administration), Cracow, 16 February 
2012; Ilias Anagnostopoulos, ‘Criminal justice cooperation in the European Union after the first 
few “steps”: a defence view’, ERA Forum 15 (1) (2014), 9–24.
40Javier Argomaniz, Oliver Bures and Christian Kaunert, ‘A decade of  EU counter-terrorism 
and intelligence: a critical assessment’, Intelligence and national security 30 (2–3) (2015), 
191–206.
41European Parliament, Resolution of 27 February 2014 with recommendations to the Commission 
on the review of the European Arrest Warrant.
42Niall Fennelly, ‘European arrest warrant: recent developments’. Address to the Academy of 
European Law Conference, EU Courts in the area of freedom and justice: recent developments, 
Trier, 14/15 June 2007.
43Julia Hoffmann, ‘Terrorism blacklisting: putting European human rights guarantees to the 
test’, Constellations 15 (2008), 543–60. 
44Amnesty International, Human rights dissolving at the borders?
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described by Murphy as ‘counter-law’ or ‘law against law’,45 was subsequently 
amended in response to a series of judgments from the European Court of Justice, 
resulting in procedural amendments to ensure both access to effective judicial 
review and the provisions of reasons for a suspect’s initial listing.46 The most recent 
Directive from the EU has also incorporated the measures contained in UN 
Security Council Resolution 2178 in relation to foreign terrorist fighters, with 
largely negative consequences for human rights standards in European countries.47 
In January 2017, for example, Amnesty International expressed its concern that 
counter-terrorism measures adopted in the aftermath of UNSC Resolution 2178 
‘have been steadily dismantling [the European human rights system], putting hard 
won rights at risk’,48 citing concerns about abuse of the definition of terrorism, the 
use of secret evidence and the criminalisation of various forms of expression.
PART 2: CRIMINOLOGY, GOVERNMENTALITY AND  
THE LIMITS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
In EU criminal justice, therefore, as elsewhere, the logic of security, with its 
‘unknown unknowns’,49 has regularly trumped concerns about human rights, 
taking not only the ‘exceptional’ but also the ‘ordinary’ criminal justice sphere in 
a decidedly pre-emptive direction.50 While the human rights credentials of the 
European Union are little in doubt, their failure to act as a bulwark against exces-
sive securitisation recalls earlier arguments made by Lucia Zedner51 and others 
such as Suzanne Krasmann52 regarding the limits of the human rights idiom as a 
means of resisting the siren call of security and the emerging paradigm of pre-
ventive justice. Zedner identifies several difficulties with the traditional approach 
to human rights, among them: (i) the heavy emphasis on the judiciary at the 
expense of other institutions/decision-makers; (ii) the neglect of the information 
supplied by ‘expert’ non-judicial decision-makers such as the intelligence services; 
(iii) the manner in which human rights set up binaries concerning compliance or 
non-compliance, giving rise to (iv) the need for ‘thicker’ normative basis for cri-
tique. This latter point has been echoed by Ian Loader and Richard Sparks53 in 
their quest for a public criminology that is actively engaged with the democratic 
process. How, they wonder, can criminology contribute to the search for a better 
politics of criminal justice in a manner that goes beyond the human rights idiom, 
which they perceive as too narrow and legalistic?
45Murphy, EU counterterrorism law.
46Elizabeth Guild, ‘The uses and abuses of counter-terrorism policies in Europe: the case of the 
“Terrorist Lists.”’ Journal of Common Market Studies 46 (2008), 173–193; Jennifer Lang, ‘EU counter-
terrorism: security, justice, democracy and opportunity for all?’ 14 August 2011. Available at: http://
www.e-ir.info/2011/08/14/eu-counter-terrorism-security-justice-democracy-and- opportunity-for-all/ 
(8 August 2018).
47Council of the European Union, Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 
2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA.
48Amnesty International, Dangerously disproportionate: the ever-expanding national security 
state in Europe (London, 2017), 7.
49To use a now famous Rumsfeldian phrase. See Donald Rumsfeld, ‘Defense Department 
Briefing’ C-SPAN, 12 February 2002. Available at: https://www.c-span.org/video/?168646-1/
defense-department-briefing (8 August 2018).
50Murphy, ‘The constitution of EU counter-terrorism law’.
51Lucia Zedner, ‘Pre-crime and post-criminology?’ Theoretical Criminology 11 (2) (2007), 
261–75.
52Suzanne Krasmann ‘Law’s knowledge: on the susceptibility and resistance of legal practices 
to security matters’, Theoretical Criminology 16 (4) (2012), 373–94.
53Ian Loader and Richard Sparks, Public Criminology? (London, 2010). 
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This returns us to the first point made by Zedner and the question of  the 
‘political’. In all criminal justice policymaking, but a fortiori in matters of 
the security of  the state, the success of  human rights claims is highly depen-
dent upon their political or strategic viability. As Fiona de Londras et al. 
observe in research conducted with European policymakers working in the 
security field, 
ultimately what determines the outcome of any process relating to counter-
terrorism is political will: in the absence of a definitive legal decision as to 
‘legitimacy’ (i.e. a court case), political judgement determines proportionality, 
necessity and ultimately legitimacy.54 
Such deceptively simple findings invite a view of human rights less as an unprob-
lematic vector of  normative aspirations, and more as a ‘battleground’55 that is 
highly susceptible to security claims in a given moment. In this light, proposed 
‘solutions’ to excessive securitisation such as a ‘culture of   justification’56—which 
places the onus of  justification for any restrictive measures on the political body 
proposing the measure, to show that any putative laws meet fundamental 
requirements of  legality and respect for human rights—appear to somewhat 
miss the point. Krasmann identifies this weakness in current human rights dis-
course as the assumption of  a common concern about rights in this field. As she 
argues, the fatal flaw in the argument is that ‘it presupposes what has yet to 
arise, namely a common concern about governmental encroachment in the 
name of security and a willingness of  all parties to join in that discourse’.57 
When combined with pressure from international organisations such as the UN 
Security Council—and what Cathleen Powell58 terms the ‘culture of  authority’ 
flowing therefrom—it is not difficult to see how the sheer ‘instrumentality and 
hegemonic’59 force of  executive and legislative action finds human-rights 
 abusing measures rapidly outpacing judicial proceedings (witness the findings 
by the European Court of  Human Rights on CIA black sites some 12 years 
after the event60).
Yet, as the critical criminologist Stan Cohen has argued, ‘intellectual scep-
ticism [about human rights] cannot become an excuse for political non- 
engagement’61. Taking up this mantle, Krasmann has proposed a radical break 
with the liberal conception of  law (and therefore rights) as an isolated, ideal 
body, and towards a Foucauldian reconception of  law ‘as a practice’, discern-
ible only in the manner of  its realisation. As an illustration of  law’s limits in 
the security field and its willingness to bend to what is considered ‘necessary’, 
she cites the example of  torture and the manner in which it has been inscribed 
into law, both in the  infamous US ‘torture memos’ and in scholarly debate 
54Fiona De Londras et al., SECILE: The impact, legitimacy and effectiveness of EU counterter-
rorism legislation (SECILE, 2015). Available at: https://fdelondras.files.wordpress.com/2016/01/
secile-d5-3.pdf, 24 (8 August 2018). (Emphasis added.)
55Panu Minkkinen, Sovereignty, knowledge, law (London, 2009).
56David Dyzenhaus, ‘Deference, security and human rights’, in Benjamin Goold and Liona 
Lazarus (eds), Security and Human Rights (Portland, 2007), 125–56. 
57Krasmann, ‘Law’s knowledge’, 381–2.
58Cathleen Powell, ‘The legal authority of the United Nations security council’, in Goold and 
Lazarus, Security and Human Rights.
59Leanne Weber, Elaine Fishwick and Marinella Marmo, Crime, justice and human rights 
(London, 2014), 99.
60Al-Nashiri v. Poland; Abu-Zubaydah v. Poland. Application no. 28761/11, 24 July 2014.
61Cited in Ruth Jamieson and Kieran McEvoy, ‘Conflict, suffering and the promise of human 
rights’, in C. Chinkin et al., Crime, social control and human rights: from moral panics to states of 
denial: essays in honour of Stanley Cohen (Willan, 2007).
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(eg Dershowitz62). Reconceptualised thus, law and rights appear highly contin-
gent, political and relational. Unlike conventional approaches to rights, 
the focus is firmly on modes of  thinking (of  all decision-makers, not only the 
 judiciary); forms of  knowledge informing such decision-making; and the 
mechanisms by which these are translated into reality. More concretely, this 
would involve the application of  a Foucault-inspired governmentality analytic 
to identify: the process and context in which departures from human rights 
standards are made; the ‘rationalities’ and ‘knowledges’ that facilitate them; 
the practices and devices (‘technologies’) that translate political reasoning into 
programmes of  government;63 and the policy lessons we can learn from these 
observations.64
Foucault’s conception of  law and rights has historically been associated with 
the postmodern school of  thought, suggesting he would have no truck with the 
universalist concept of  human rights at all.65 Foucault was an elusive thinker, 
however, whose thought was constantly evolving. More recently, scholars such 
as Ben Golder have detected in his later work a ‘critical affirmation’ of  rights 
discourse, according to which he neither rejects nor embraces rights but rather 
engages ‘critically within and against existing rights discourse’.66 On this view, 
rights are neither apolitical ideals, nor ‘an anti-politics—a pure defense of  the 
innocent and powerless against power’,67 but rather political tools which may be 
implicated in relations of  power as much as a means of  criticising them.68 
Foucault, then, forces us to pay attention to the power-knowledge networks 
inherent in the bureaucratic, political and juridical apparatus through which 
rights are negotiated. In so doing, his work opens up important possibilities for 
a politically richer, more self-reflexive and ultimately less disingenuous rights 
discourse.69
Foucault’s aim was always to understand the limits of ways of thinking in 
order to find possibilities for thinking differently, thereby enhancing our capacity 
for change. For a fully-developed analysis of governance in this area, however, 
various dimensions of the bigger picture are required which criminology can do 
much to provide. First of all, securitising discourses in the counter-terrorism 
field are best understood against the backdrop of a broader ‘punitive turn’,70 one 
62Alan Dershowitz, ‘Tortured reasoning’, in Sanford Levinson (ed.), Torture: a collection 
(Oxford and New York, 2004), 257–80. 
63Alan Hunt, ‘Encounters with juridical assemblages: reflections on Foucault, law and the 
juridical’, in Ben Golder (ed.), Re-reading Foucault: on law, power and rights (London, 2012), 
64–84; Nikolas Rose, Pat O’Malley and Mariana Valverde, ‘Governmentality’, Annual Review of 
Law and Social Science, Vol. 2 (2006), 83–104.
64Randy K. Lippert, ‘Governmentality analytics and human rights in criminology’, in Weber 
et al. (eds), The Routledge International Handbook of Criminology and Human Rights (London, 
2016), 80–90.
65Weber et al., Crime, justice and human rights. The modern, universalistic notion of human 
rights can of course be said to conflict with the postmodernist privileging of relativism and 
contingency.
66Ben Golder, ‘Foucault’s critical (yet ambivalent) affirmation: three figures of rights’, Social & 
Legal Studies 20 (3) (2011), 283–12.
67W. Brown, ‘The most we can hope for…: human rights and the politics of fatalism’, South 
Atlantic Quarterly 103 (2004), 451–63: 453.
68Duncan Ivison, Rights (Stocksfield, 2008).
69Golder, ‘Foucault’s critical (yet ambivalent) affirmation: three figures of rights’.
70See, for example, Claire Hamilton, ‘Reconceptualising penality: towards a multidimensional 
test for punitiveness’, British Journal of Criminology 52 (4) (2014), 321–43; Claire Hamilton, 
Reconceptualising penality: a comparative perspective on punitiveness in Ireland, Scotland and New 
Zealand (Farnham, UK, 2014).
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that is frequently linked to the ‘free market turn’ or advent of neoliberalism.71 
In proposing a broader ‘sociology of security’, Ian Loader72 correctly points to 
the need for connections to be forged between contemporary discourses on secu-
rity and rights and the various political and penological transformations that 
have gone before them. As Loader argues, it is the ‘logic of populist reason’73 or, 
in David Garland’s words, ‘culture of control’74 (viz. risk management and reac-
tion politics) that have created the conditions in which popular appeals to secu-
rity can be made so successfully. Indeed, for some criminologists the ‘war on 
terror’ simply forms ‘more of the same’ in terms of the mass violent incarcera-
tion we have seen emerge in certain neoliberal democratic states in recent 
decades.75 Certainly, it would be foolish in any analysis of counter-terrorism to 
ignore the fact that the pursuit of security of a more anodyne kind has been high 
on the political agenda since many decades before the emergence of ‘super- 
terrorism’, in 2001.76
Within criminology, the governmentality analytic has played an important 
role in understanding and conceptualising important features of the ‘punitive 
turn’ and the growing centrality of ‘law and order’ as a political and public con-
cern.77 Perhaps most significantly, the two key themes of ‘responsibilisation’ and 
‘governing through [crime]’ have been used extensively in the criminological lit-
erature in order to render intelligible significant changes in the penal and crime 
control field.78 The former concept, elaborated by Garland,79 is a neoliberal 
rationality that devolves responsibility for governance of crime from the state to 
local authorities, private security agencies or individuals. The latter, developed 
by Jonathan Simon, refers to the use of crime as a mode of governance in order 
to justify ‘interventions that have other motivations’.80 Together with the work 
of other criminologists writing in a governmentality vein, such as O’Malley,81 
Garland and Simon’s work has been adept at linking newly ascendant technolo-
gies (e.g., risk assessments) in the crime field with political rationalities hostile to 
the welfare state, namely, neoliberalism. Through the identification of key gov-
ernmental rationalities of control (for instance, an economic style of reasoning), 
governmentality analysis has also heavily influenced what is  probably the 
71David Downes, ‘Comparative criminology, globalization and the “punitive turn”’, in David 
Nelken (ed.), Comparative criminal justice and globalization (Farnham, Surrey, 2011), 27–48.
72Ian Loader, ‘The cultural lives of security and rights’, in Goold and Lazarus, Security and 
Human Rights (Oxford, 2007).
73Ernesto Laclau, On populist reason (London, New York, 2005).
74David Garland, The culture of control (Oxford, 2001).
75Phil Scraton and Jude McCulloch, The violence of incarceration (New York, 2009).
76Zedner, ‘Pre-crime and post-criminology?’; Claire Hamilton and Giulia Berlusconi, ‘Counter-
terrorism, contagion and criminology: the case of France’, Criminology & Criminal Justice. Article 
first published online, 3 January 2018, available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/1748895817751829 
(8 August 2018).
77Randy K. Lippert and Kevin Stenson, ‘Advancing governmentality studies: lessons from 
social constructionism’, Theoretical Criminology 14 (4) (2010), 473–94.
78Randy K. Lippert, ‘Governmentality’, in Avi Brismann, Eamon Carrabine and Nigel South 
(eds), The Routledge Companion to Criminological Theory and Concepts (London, 2016), 451–54.
79David Garland, ‘Governmentality and the problem of crime’, Theoretical Criminology 1 (1997), 
173–214; Garland, The culture of control.
80Jonathon Simon, Governing through crime: how the war on crime transformed American democ-
racy and created a culture of fear (New York, 2007), 4.
81Pat O’Malley, ‘Risk, power and crime prevention’, Economy and Society 21 (3) (1992), 
252–75; Pat O’Malley, ‘Volatile and contradictory punishment’, Theoretical Criminology 
3 (1999), 175–96.
This content downloaded from 
            213.202.174.151 on Tue, 02 Mar 2021 16:54:36 UTC             
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Hamilton—Human Rights, Counter-terrorism and Criminology 215
seminal work in the field of the sociology of punishment, Garland’s Culture of 
Control,82 including its central organising concept (‘ culture of control’).83
Deploying these and other conceptual tools, therefore, governmentality- 
informed criminology may help provide answers to the elusive question of how 
we currently govern the terrorism problem and, no less significant, how we are to 
be governed.84 The ‘added value’ of the governmentality literature within the 
security/rights area, however, is not confined to the provision of historical per-
spectives on counter-terrorism and its relation to the complex and contradictory 
field of neoliberal politics. On the contrary, very real benefits may be derived 
from a ‘horizontal’ analysis that can situate contemporary counter-terrorism 
policies alongside crime governance strategies more broadly. Within the legal 
and international relations literature, terrorism is often treated as a distinct gov-
ernmental problem because of the existential threat it poses to the state, and 
therefore one that invites analysis of the nature of exceptional sovereign power 
or ‘exceptionalism’ (see for example, Giorgio Agamben85). Recent research on 
the impact of counter-terrorism law and policy, however, suggests that power 
permeates at different levels so that the various governmental strategies devel-
oped to control serious crime in recent years have much in common with those 
applied to terrorism.86 Indeed, in some jurisdictions at least (we take the case of 
France, see Claire Hamilton and Giuilia Berlusconi87) the reciprocal nature of 
policies directed at terrorism and at organised crime and drug trafficking renders 
highly problematic the neat division between these two areas. Security measures 
in the counter-terrorism sphere, like those applied to crime more generally, 
are,  in Foucauldian terms, disciplinary measures and, as Neal88 has argued 
strongly in the context of the international relations literature, should not be 
sealed off  from (security) politics more generally.
CONCLUSIONS
Viewed in this light, there are strong reasons for analysing counter-terrorism 
 measures, with their serious implications for human rights, through the lens of 
governmentality-informed criminology. While human rights have a long history, 
connections between existing criminological scholarship and human rights frame-
works are of relatively recent origin.89 Perhaps unsurprisingly, given Foucault’s 
supposed rejection of human rights, the governmentality ‘toolbox’ as developed 
within criminology has not been applied at all to human rights. As Randy Lippert 
argues, however, the fresh, and radical, perspective it affords, has much to offer 
82Garland, The culture of control.
83Pat O’Malley, ‘Governmental criminology’, in Eugene McLaughlin and Tim Newburn (eds), 
The SAGE handbook of criminological theory (London, 2009), 319–36. 
84Lippert, ‘Governmentality analytics and human rights in criminology’.
85Giorgio Agamben, State of exception (Chicago, Il., 2005).
86John Lea, ‘From the criminalisation of war to the militarisation of crime control’, in Sandra 
Walklate and Ross McGarry (eds), Criminology and war: transgressing the borders (Abingdon, 
2015), 198–211.
87Hamilton and Berlusconi, ‘Counter-terrorism, contagion and criminology: the case of France’.
88Andrew Neal, ‘“Events dear boy, events”: terrorism and security from the perspective of pol-
itics’, Critical Studies on Terrorism 5 (1) (2012), 107–20.
89Therese Murphy and Noel Whitty, ‘Making history: academic criminology and human 
rights’, British Journal of Criminology 53 (4) (2013), 568–87; Leanne Weber, Elaine Fishwick, 
Marinella Marmo (eds), The Routledge International Handbook of Criminology and Human Rights 
(London, 2016).
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critically-orientated criminologists working in the field, not least a better under-
standing of how discourses can become ‘amenable to progressive intervention and 
reform…while avoiding ill-conceived totalizing endeavours doomed to fail’.90 
Indeed, it is perhaps only through careful empirical examination of European 
governmental discourse in the security field that the detailed workings of human 
rights claims and decision-making will be revealed, enabling advocates of rights to 
move beyond the current impasse whereby rights are frequently deprioritised.
90Lippert, ‘Governmentality analytics and human rights in criminology’, 88.
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